What is personal identity? This inquiry has beenapproached and bantered by philosophers for a considerable length of time.
Theissue of individual character is making sense of what conditions and qualitiesare key and adequate for a person to exist as the same being at one time asanother. Some think personal identity is physical, taking a materialisticperspective assuming that bodily continuity or physicality is the thing thatmakes a man, a man with the view that even mental things are caused by a typeof physical occasion. Others adopt a more visionary strategy with theconviction that mental continuity is the sole factor in building up personalidentity holding that physical things are only impressions of the brain. Onemore viewpoint on personal identity and the one I will attempt to clarify anddefend in this paper is that personal identity requires both physical andmental continuity; my argument is as per the following:1) Bodilycontinuity is needed for the capacity of mental continuity. 2) Psychological continuity is necessary indefining personal identity.
Therefore, mental and physical continuity areboth necessary and sufficient for defining personal identity. These premises, both ofwhich are true, support the conclusion of this argument. The first premisestates that bodily continuity is required for the capacity of mentalcontinuity; this is obviously valid as all mental movement is created insidethe mind whose work depends on sufficient operation of the body. Moreover, inthe second premise it is noticed that psychological continuity is fundamentalin characterizing personal identity. Psychological continuity as it identifieswith individual personality is a blend of memory and consciousness. Memory is at the core of the way a great many people considerpersonal identity. It is on account of I remember the firsts throughout mylife that I think I’m the same person from that awkward adolescent. On theoff chance that I had no memory of past encounters, the feeling that I existedin the past would be significantly traded off.
Memory additionally is at thecore of philosophical discussions of personal personality. Maybe the mostprominent record of personal identity, attributed to Locke, holds that thesesorts of memories are (a piece of) what make me the same as the person Iwas in the past. Memories of past activities go towardsconstituting personal identity. Philosopher Locke, whose immediatephilosophical opponents, Reid and Butler, rejected the constitutionthesis. But they didn’t shrink from relyingon memory to ground judgments of personal identity. One issue that can beraised is that there appear to be gaps in our consciousness: we overlookthings, and once in a while our consciousness is interrupted, by rest or atrance like state. A young child may grow up into an old manwho remembers nothing from his childhood and is of an entirely differentnature, by Locke’s theory the consciousness would be unique and hence theold man and child would be not be indistinguishable. In addressing this, Lockeadheres to his fundamental theory: same consciousness measures up to personalidentity.
A man is a similar individual when he rests as he is the point atwhich he wakes, because his conscious is indistinguishable, and by asimilar token the young child and the man who remembers nothing of hischildhood are not by and by indistinguishable, on the grounds that they are nota similar conscious. Locke additionally contends that realists still seeindividual way of life as something besides the physical issue; generally,there would be no concept of individual character, as the issue allthrough our body (counting that affecting our brain and hence our thoughts)is continually evolving. Locke extends his argument to ontological systemsthat posit insignificant substances: whatever the substance in whichthought happens, be it material or unimportant, “the same consciousness beingpreserved, whether in the same of different substances, the personal identityis preserved” (Locke).
If there is a technique for exchanging consciousness, itis also keeping up personal identity. The so-calledmemory-criterion of personal identity is often contrasted with the criterion ofthe spatiotemporal continuity (bodily continuity) of a living body. An objection to that is to bodily continuityis, let’s say, my body lasts longer than I do.
Or perhaps I last longer thanit. Certainly we don’t last the same amount of time. How then can we be thesame? Second, the proposed criterion now seems to ride intolerably roughshodover the memory criterion. If memory is as irrelevant as it now seems to be,how did it ever get into the discussion at all? Thirdly, there is the feelingthat my identity cannot possibly be the identity of a body I can clearlyimagine myself exchanging for another body, or even imagine myself losingaltogether. The body is in a steady condition of progress, cells supplanting cellsby the thousands at any given time; how at that point can real coherence evenbe if the body is in an interminable condition of progress? How might one beviewed as a similar individual if the parts are always being supplanted? So faras that is concerned, consider the possibility that a man loses an limb andgets a prosthetic, would they be a similar individual then? Bodilycontinuity as I comprehend it is the association or example of parts that makeup the entire, not simply the parts. The parts may supplant themselves aftersome time, yet it doesn’t upset progression or character since the motivationbehind the ‘new’ parts are to keep up the capacity of the first structure.
Butmemory theorists do not differ from bodily theorists in thinking in terms ofpossible clashes of memory and bodily criteria. In this part I shall argue thata scale of bodily continuity is not the only or the best kind of spatiotemporalcriterion for persons-another is available, and that no correct spatiotemporalcriterion of personal identity can conflict with any correct memory-criterionor character-continuity criterion of personal identity. It is this whichprevents the notion of person from falling in two.
In conclusion mental andphysical continuity are both important and adequate for characterizing personalidentity. From adolescents onwards a person isn’t the “same” howeverthat does not mean they aren’t the same person. By change, individuals aregrowing, however will dependably have similar memories, and same body partsthat make them their identity as a person.
Workingin conjunction with memory is consciousness, consciousness is simply themeaning of the self; it is simply the mind’s ability to point, separatingamongst itself and a question making consciousness of “I” all throughbodily and memory changes. Consciousness is the center of unrestrained choiceand expectation; it is in charge of the capacity of a man to pick. All thingsconsidered, it is my belief that characterizing personal identity depends bothbodily and mental continuity.